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I. INTRODUCTION
The belief no longer prevails that every offense in a like legal cat-
egory calls for an identical punishment without regard to the past
life and habits of a particular offender. This whole country has
traveled far from the period in which the death sentence was an
automatic and common place result of convictions . .. .In Lockett v. Ohio,' the United States Supreme Court found that Ohio's
capital statute violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments of the
Constitution because the statute permitted consideration of only three
mitigating factors.3 The purpose of mitigating factors is to reduce culpa-
* The author wishes to acknowledge the conscientious assistance of Elaine C. Hilliard,
Esq., and Mary Ann Kuzila.
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
2 438 U.S. 586 (1978). Chief Justice Burger, writing for the plurality, stated that "the
sentencer [should] not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defen-
dant proffers as a basis for his sentence less than death." Id. at 604 (emphasis in original)
(footnote omitted).
3 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (Page 1975) (amended (1981)). The mitigating cir-
cumstances were:
(1) The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it; (2) It is unlikely that the
offense would have been committed but for the fact that the offender was under
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1983
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bility and ensure "that the punishment assigned for a criminal act may
for ethical and humanitarian reasons, be tempered out of consideration of
the individual offender and his crime."'4 Lockett had asserted that it was
unconstitutional for a state to limit a sentencer in its consideration of
mitigating circumstances. The Supreme Court agreed, stating:
[A] statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from
giving independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defen-
dant's character and record and to circumstances of the offense
proffered in mitigation creates the risk that the death penalty will
be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe
penalty.6
In response to Lockett, the Ohio legislature enacted a new capital stat-
ute, effective on October 19, 1981, to redress the constitutional infirmities
detailed by the Lockett Court. The legislature increased the number of
statutory mitigating factors from three to seven.' The last mitigating fac-
duress, coercion, or strong provocation; and (3) The offense was chiefly the prod-
uct of the offender's psychosis or mental deficiency, though such condition is in-
sufficient to establish the defense of insanity.
Id. § 2929.04(B)(1), (2), (3) (amended (1981)). Under the previous capital statute, even if
one or more aggravating circumstances was proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the death
penalty for aggravated murder was precluded if the trial court found that any of the three
mitigating circumstances was established by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. §
2929.04(B). See Comment, The Constitutionality of Ohio's Death Penalty, 38 OHIO ST. L.J.
617 (1977) (hereinafter cited as Death Penalty); Comment, Capital Punishment in Ohio:
The Constitutionality of the Death Penalty Statute, 3 U. DAYTON L. REV. 169 (1978);
Comment, Legislative Response to Furman v. Georgia-Ohio Restores the Death Penalty, 8
AKRON L. REV. 149 (1974).
State v. Woods, 48 Ohio St. 2d 127, 137, 357 N.E.2d 1059, 1066 (1976).
438 U.S. at 597.
Id. at 605.
7 Presently, the statute provides that the sentencing authority shall:
weigh against the aggravating circumstances proved beyond a reasonable doubt,
the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history, character, and back-
ground of the offender, and all the following factors:
(1) Whether the victim of the offense induced or facilitated it;
(2) Whether it is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for
the fact that the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation;
(3) Whether, at the time of committing the offense, the offender, because of a
mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law;
(4) The youth of the offender;
(5) The offender's lack of a significant history of prior criminal convictions and
delinquency adjudications;
(6) If the offender was a participant in the offense but not the principal of-
fender, the degree of the offender's participation in the offense and the degree of
the offender's participation in the acts that led to the death of the victim;
(7) Any other factors that are relevant to the issue of whether the offender
should be sentenced to death.
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tor allows the sentencing authority to consider any other relevant fac-
tor(s) when deciding whether the offender should be sentenced to death.'
Twelve men and one woman have been sentenced to death under the
new capital statute.9 One additional jury recommendation of death has
been overturned by a trial judge.'0 Increasingly, the existence of mitigat-
ing factors may be the critical factor in determining whether the person
convicted will live or die. However, the determination that mitigating fac-
tors are present will not preclude the death penalty. In Ohio, the court
must be convinced that the aggravating circumstances" outweigh the
mitigating factors by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.'" If a three-judge
panel acts as the sentencing authority, its finding must be unanimous.13
The trial courts must issue written opinions whenever the death pen-
alty is imposed. " This Note will analyze opinions handed down since the
enactment of the capital statute to ascertain whether the various mitigat-
ing factors adequately meet the concerns of Lockett. Part II contains a
brief overview of Ohio's capital plan. The scope and interpretation of the
mitigating factors should dominate future appellate decisions; thus, in
Part III, four mitigating factors will be examined. In Part IV the treat-
ment of the mitigating factors in the weighing process will be explored.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (Page 1982).
8 Id. § 2929.04(B)(7).
' Sharon Young in State v. Young, No. B832363 (C.P. Hamilton County 1983); Ernest
Martin in State v. Martin, No. CR180038 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1983); David Steffen in
State v. Steffen, No. B-824004 (C.P. Hamilton County 1983); David Mapes in State v.
Mapes, No. CR-181703 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1983); Jeffrey Thompson in State v.
Thompson, No. 82L15216 (C.P. Licking County 1983); Frank Spisak in State v. Spisak,
No. CR-176651 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1983); John Byrd in State v. Byrd, No. B-831662
(C.P. Hamilton County 1983); Arthur Tyler in State v. Tyler, No. 181132B (C.P. Cuyahoga
County 1983); Donald Maurer in State v. Maurer, No. 82-2545 (C.P. Stark County 1983);
Bill Penix in State v. Penix, No. 82-CR-241 (C.P. Clark County 1983); John Glenn in State
v. Glenn, No. 81 CR 933 (C.P. Portage County 1982); Billy Rogers in State v. Rogers, No.
81-6906 (C.P. Lucas County 1982); Leonard Jenkins in State v. Jenkins, No. CR 168784
(C.P. Cuyahoga County 1982). The jury recommended death in all cases.
" State v. Kiser, No. 82-CR69 (C.P. Ross County 1983). The jury recommended death,
but the judge, pursuant to § 2929.03(D)(3) of the Ohio Revised Code, did not find that the
State of Ohio had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances
outweighed the mitigating factors. Id. trial op. at 16. See State v. Forney, No. CR 82 4443
(C.P. Summit County 1982). A three-judge panel failed to find unanimously that the aggra-
vating circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors. Id. trial op. at 2. Thus, the death
penalty could not be imposed and the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment with
parole eligibility after serving 30 full years. Journal Entry, No. 10928 at 1, State v. Forney,
No. CR 82 4443.
" For an excellent analysis of the aggravating circumstances in Ohio's capital plan, see
Note, Capital Punishment in Ohio: Aggravating Circumstances, 31 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 495
(1982).
" OHIO REV. COnE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(3) (Page 1982).
" Id.
', Id. § 2929.03(F).
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1983
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
The examination of the mitigating factors in the capital statute .is rele-
vant to the determination of whether mitigating the death penalty in
Ohio will be a fact or an elusive fiction.
II. THE OHIO CAPITAL PLAN
The Ohio capital plan is a bifurcated process, 5 whereby the offender's
guilt of the principal charge and any specification of an aggravating cir-
cumstance 16 is determined at the trial stage. The offender may waive a
trial by jury and elect to utilize a three-judge panel as trier of fact and
sentencer.17 If the offender is found guilty of the principal charge, but
found not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the specifications, the sen-
tencer shall impose life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving
twenty years. 8 If the offender is found guilty of the principal charge and
one or more of the specifications, the process enters the sentencing stage.
Initially, upon the request of the defendant, the court will order a pre-
sentence investigation and mental examination. 9 Reports of these studies
will be among the evidence considered by the sentencer. Pursuant to the
statute, the sentencer shall also consider: evidence adduced at trial rele-
vant to the aggravating circumstances; evidence adduced at trial relevant
to the mitigating circumstances; other evidence and testimony relevant to
the nature of the aggravating circumstances; other evidence and testi-
mony relevant to the statutory mitigating factors or any other factors in
mitigation of the imposition of the death sentence; any statement of the
defendant; and any statements of counsel for the defense and prosecution
that are relevant to the penalty that should be imposed.20
Furthermore, the defendant is to be given "great latitude" in the pres-
" The Supreme Court, in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), approved of a bifurcated
sentencing process:
Much of the information that is relevant to the sentencing decision may have no
relevance to the question of guilt, or may even be extremely prejudicial to a fair
determination of that question. This problem however is scarcely insurmountable.
Those who have studied the question suggest that a bifurcated procedure-one in
which the question of sentence is not considered until the determination of guilt
has been made-is the best answer.
Id. at 190-91.
"o All of the specifications are tried and determined in the guilt phase except prior convic-
tions. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(5) (Page 1982). The defendant may elect to have
this specification determined in the sentencing phase. In either case, however, the determi-
nation of the existence of this specification is made by the trial judge or three-judge panel
and not the jury. Id. § 2929.022(A).
17 Id.
" Id. § 2929.03(C)(1). It is important to note the distinction between a 20-year sentence
in this section and a 20-full-year sentence imposed under § 2929.03(D)(3)(a) (Page 1982).
Under the latter sentence, the offender must serve the full 20 years before he is eligible for
parole.
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entation of evidence of statutory mitigating factors and any other factors
in mitigation of the imposition of the death sentence.2 The statute places
on the defendant the burden of going forward with tle evidence of any
factors of mitigation,2 but it is silent as to which party bears the burden
of proof regarding the mitigating factors. The prosecution must prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances are sufficient
to outweigh the mitigating factors.23
If the prosecution meets its burden, the trial jury "shall recommend to
the court that the sentence of death be imposed on the offender."24 If the
prosecution fails to meet its burden, the trial jury shall recommend 25 ei-
ther a life sentence without parole for twenty full years, or a life sentence
without parole for thirty full years. The trial judge, after a jury recom-
mendation of death, may impose the jury's recommended sentence if he is
satisfied that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating fac-
tors by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.2 6 A three-judge panel must
unanimously find that the aggravating circumstances are sufficient to
outweigh the mitigating factors2 7 The judge, however, must accept the
jury's recommendation of a life sentence.2 8
Notwithstanding the penalty imposed, the court or panel is required to
state in a separate opinion the existence of any statutory or other mitigat-
ing factors, and the existence of aggravating circumstances, as well as rea-
sons why the aggravating circumstances were sufficient or insufficient to
outweigh the mitigating factors.2 9 The opinion must be filed with the ap-
21 Id.
22 Id. This provision could be interpreted to mean that the prosecution shall have the
final opportunity to speak in the sentencing process. Two Ohio trial courts have allowed the
defense to make two closing arguments. See State v. Byrd, No. B-831662, trial op. at 4
(C.P. Hamilton County 1983); State v. Steffen, No. B-824004, trial op. at 5 (C.P. Hamilton
County 1983). Section 2929.023 establishes the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was 18 years of age or older at the time of the commission of the
offense. The burden of raising the matter of age and of going forward with the evidence is
upon the defendant. Id.
22 Id. § 2929.03(D)(1).
24 Id. § 2929.03(D)(2).
20 Id. The language of the statute is that the jury shall "recommend" a life sentence.
Actually, a jury recommendation of a life sentence is an imposition of a life sentence, since
the trial judge may not overturn or alter the jury's recommendation of life. Id.
26 Id. § 2929.03(D)(3). The Ohio plan seemingly does not unduly emphasize the jury's
recommendation of death. Thus, the trial judge need offer no deference to its decision.
27 Id. § 2929.03(D)(2).
28 Id.
29 Id. § 2929.03(F). This section is clear with respect to the opinion that must be written
when the court or three-judge panel imposes death. The statute is unclear, however, as to
whether an opinion must be written when the jury brings back a life sentence, or whether
the opinion must be written when the court imposes a life sentence over a jury recommen-
dation of death. The ambiguity centers on the phrase "imposes life imprisonment." Al-
though, in effect, the jury "imposes" life imprisonment, the language of the statute is that of
a recommendation only. Arguably, only the court may impose a sentence. Therefore it would
1983-84]
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propriate clerks of the courts of appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court."
III. MITIGATING FACTORS
The first two statutory mitigating factors are identical to those found
in the prior capital statute and will not be discussed herein." It is suffi-
cient to note that under the prior law, no offender successfully estab-
lished that the victim induced the offense32 or that the offense was com-
mitted while under coercion or duress."3 The narrow scope of these two
factors makes it unlikely that an offender will be any more successful
under the new law.
The sixth mitigating factor is also narrow in scope and will not be dis-
cussed herein.34 It focuses on the degree of the defendant's participation
in the acts leading up to the offense as well as the participation in the
offense itself. However, since the great majority of capital indictments
will be brought against the principal offender, this factor, although new,
may seldom be utilized. The third, fourth, fifth, and seventh factors will
be discussed below. Special attention will be devoted to mitigating factor
three-the existence of a mental disease or defect-for that factor has
proved the one most often employed by capital defendants.
A. Mental Disease or Defect
The third mitigating factor for the sentencing authority to consider is
be realistic and beneficial to all concerned if trial judges wrote opinions in all three situa-
tions. See, e.g., State v. Shields, No. 173004-B (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1982) (defendant's
life sentence was recommended by jury and imposed by judge). The opinion did not follow
the statutory language, in that it did not state which mitigating factors existed, or why the
aggravating circumstances were insufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors.
30 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(F) (Page 1982). For a broad overview of Ohio's capital
plan, including the appellate review provisions, see Note, Ohio Enacts a Death Penalty, 7
U. DAYTON L. REv. 531 (1982).
11 For an excellent discussion of the ways in which Ohio courts interpreted the first two
mitigating factors under the prior statute, see Death Penalty, supra note 3, at 636-44. As to
the first mitigating factor, the author states that "it would be a rare case in which an indi-
vidual would be proved guilty of aggravated murder, and of a specification, and still be able
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the victim of the offense 'facilitated' it."
Id. at 637. As to the second mitigating factor, the author concludes that "these factors au-
thorize an extremely narrow inquiry into the characteristics of the criminal and his crime.
As a result, few, if any, defendants will be able to rely on them to establish mitigation." Id.
at 644.
32 Id. at 637.
33 Id. at 644. See State v. Weind, 50 Ohio St. 2d 224, 364 N.E.2d 224 (1977); State v.
Woods, 48 Ohio St. 2d 127, 357 N.E.2d 1059 (1976).
3 The Supreme Court may have narrowed the scope of this factor even further. Enmund
v. Florida, 458 U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982). In Enmund, the Court reversed the death
sentence of a non-triggerman found guilty of felony murder. Id. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 3379.
This decision would not preclude Ohio from executing vicarious felony-murderers, but it
might influence prosecutors in seeking capital indictments.
[Vol. 32:263
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"[w]hether at the time of committing the offense, the offender, because
of a mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of the law." 35 Prior to Lockett, this mitigating factor precluded the
death penalty if "[t]he offense was primarily the product of the offender's
psychosis or mental deficiency, though such condition is insufficient to
establish the defense of insanity."3
The terms have been changed, but the new factor still requires two dis-
tinct occurrences. First, the existence of a mental disease or defect 37 must
be proved. Second, the causal connection between this disease or defect
and the defendant's lack of substantial capacity either to appreciate' s the
criminality of his conduct, or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of the law, must also be proved.
Ohio's insanity test is strikingly similar to mitigating factor three. The
Ohio Supreme Court set forth the test for insanity in State v. Staten:3 s
One accused of criminal conduct is not responsible for such con-
duct if, at the time of such conduct, as the result of mental dis-
ease or defect, he does not have the capacity either to know the
wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of the law. 40
This similarity has created some problems. First, neither Staten nor sub-
"3 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(3)(Page 1982). The Model Penal Code formulation
for insanity is virtually identical to mitigating factor three. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
30 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(3) (Page 1975) (amended 1981).
3, Psychoses are mental diseases, but it seems clear that other mental afflictions will also
be classified as mental diseases. Mental deficiency is defined as:
a defective state of intelligence. It may be primary or secondary. Primary mental
deficiency is hereditary. It is not based on any visible, organic or structural change
in the brain. Secondary mental deficiency is associated with a brain defect, disease
or birth injury. In law, mental deficiency is usually divided into three grades: idi-
ocy, imbecility, and moronity. Idiocy is the most severe form; moronity, the
mildest.
State v. Bayless, 48 Ohio St. 2d 73, 95, 357 N.E.2d 1035, 1050 (1976) (quoting SCHMIDT'S
ATTORNEY'S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE M-71 (vol. II, 1975)).
38 One commentator has suggested that a substitution of "appreciate" for "know" indi-
cates a "preference for the view that a sane offender must be emotionally as well as intellec-
tually aware of the significance of his conduct." A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE, 87(1967). However, the second prong of mitigating factor three is identical to the second prong
of the insanity test. Thus, any benefit from a change from "know" to "appreciate" seems
lost, since the prosecution must merely prove that the defendant was able to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law. Apparently, proving that fact is not difficult. See
infra note 49.
3 18 Ohio St. 2d 13, 247 N.E.2d 293 (1969).
40 Id. (Syllabus I). See State v. Wilcox, 70 Ohio St. 2d 182, 436 N.E.2d 523 (1982)(the
court rejected the diminished capacity defense in Ohio).
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sequent Ohio cases have defined the term "mental disease or defect."4 At
one time mental disease was thought to be virtually synonymous with the
psychoses.4 More recently, the term has been left virtually undefined, so
that other forms of illness may be classified as "mental diseases" if a psy-
chiatrist is willing so to state.48 The term "mental disease" may be an
" District of Columbia federal courts have interpreted "mental disease or defect" to in-
clude "any abnormal condition of the mind which substantially affects mental or emotional
processes and substantially impairs behavior controls." United States v. Browner, 471 F.2d
969, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1972); King v. United States, 372 F.2d 383, 387-88 (D.C. Cir. 1967);
McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
41 A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 38, at 84.
43 Id. at 84-85. See State v. Mapes, No. CR-181703 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1983). In
Mapes, the defendant's argument that he possessed certain genes (D and E) which caused
him to act the way he acted was dismissed by the trial judge as "unsupported by expert
testimony or even by hearsay." Id. trial op. at 4-5; State v. Spisak, No. CR-176651 (C.P.
Cuyahoga County 1983). In Spisak, the defense experts characterized the defendant as suf-
fering from personality disorders classified as schizotypal and borderline personality. Id.
trial op. at 8. A schizotypal person "includes one who has profound disturbances in his
thought process, perception and behavior. Id. "The borderline personality has a psychotic
element without the break with reality involved in psychosis; its characteristics are impul-
siveness, unpredictability, self-damaging behavior, ranging from consistent bad judgment to
self-mutilation, inability to relate properly, intense anger and lack of personal identity." Id.
(quoting from Dr. McPhearson's testimony at 30). The court concluded that "[tlhe defen-
dant's personality disorders and their manifestations: his Nazism, his sexual problems, his
isolation, etc., cannot be seen, either alone or together as in anyway lessening his degree of
criminal responsibility." Id. State v. Steffen, No. B-824004 (C.P. Hamilton County 1983).
The Steffen court stated: "[Tihe impact of the defendant's earlier years caused him to.. .
suffer from a mental disease or defect known as atypical dissociation disorder." Id. trial op.
at 20. See DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 260 (3d ed. 1980)
(describing the disorder). However, substantial expert tesimony classified the defendant as
suffering from a borderline personality disorder which was not due to any mental illness or
disease. Steffen, trial op. at 18; State v. Thompson, No. 82 L 15216 (C.P. Licking County
1983). In Thompson, a defense expert classified the defendant as suffering from a "major
personality malformation" which in his opinion was a defect within the meaning of OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(3). Id. trial op. at 12.
As to alcohol and drugs, the Supreme Court of Ohio has stated that "the defense of in-
sanity cannot be successfully established simply on the basis that the condition resulted
from the use of intoxicants or drugs, where such use is not shown to be habitual or chronic."
State v. Toth, 52 Ohio St. 2d 206, 210, 371 N.E.2d 831, 834 (1977). See Commonwealth v.
Sheehan, 376 Mass. 765, 383 N.E.2d 1115 (1978) (drug addiction not considered a mental
disease or defect which would support finding of lack of criminal responsibility). Alcoholism
and depression have been recognized as "mental diseases or defects." State v. Kiser, No. 82-
CR69, trial op. at 8-9 (C.P. Ross County 1983). Epilepsy is a neurological disease often
associated with mental disease or defect. See United States v. Browner, 471 F.2d 969, 975
(D.C. Cir. 1972). Other mental conditions may also be termed "mental diseases or defects."
For a discussion of the pre-menstrual syndrome and insanity, see Wallach & Rubin, The
Pre-Menstrual Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 209 (1971);
Hilliard, Pre-Menstrual Syndrome: Relation to Insanity Defense in Ohio, (Dec. 14, 1982)
(unpublished manuscript on file in CLEV. ST. L. REV. office); see generally Annot., 42
A.L.R.3d 1414 (1972) (XYY Syndrome as affecting criminal responsibility). Sociopathy and
narcotics addiction could be regarded as a mental disease. A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 38, at
[Vol. 32:263
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inadequate description of psychiatric realities," but it has remained in
use, perhaps because no better concept has been found to replace it."'
Second, although mental defect has not been defined in Ohio, the term
has been described as a "condition which is not considered capable of
either improving or deteriorating and which may be either congenital, or
the result of injury, or the residual effect of a physical or mental ill-
ness.""6 This definition would encompass the large class of people suffer-
ing from mental retardation. It seems likely that this group, more often
than any other, will seek mitigation due to the presence of a mental de-
fect. Commentators and courts have been reluctant to classify a mental
retardate as insane. 47 Such a person will probably not fare any better
under mitigating factor three. Under Ohio's old "psychosis-mental defi-
ciency" test, no mental retardate (or any other person) ever benefited
from that provision.4 8 Furthermore, under the new test, presumably all
the prosecution must do to rebut evidence that the offender lacked sub-
stantial capacity is to proffer evidence that the defendant functioned ra-
tionally during the time period of the commission of the offense.4' Unfor-
89; contra MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
14 "Mental disease" is a "concept that has no systematic role in psychiatric doctrine, and
is not found in the official Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 2nd ed.
(1968) of the American Psychiatric Association." H. FINGARETTE & A. HASSE, MENTAL DISA-
BILITIES AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY, 9 (1979). See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, comment
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). "Nothing makes the inquiry into responsibility more unreal for
the psychiatrist than limitation of the issue to some ultimate extreme of total incapacity,
when clinical experience reveals only a graded scale with marks along the way." Id.
45 A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 38, at 87.
"' Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
47 See A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 38, at 246 n.15. The author states that "existing tests of
mental retardation are so culture-bound that there would be a real risk of classifying as
insane persons who are merely uneducated. Moreover, mental hospitals are not ordinarily
equipped to deal with the mentally retarded." Id. See generally McDonald v. United States,
312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (evidence of an I.Q. of 68 would not, standing alone, entitle
submission of issue to jury); Lewis v. State, 380 So.2d 970 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979) (jury could
have found defendant with an I.Q. of 45 sane); State v. Hall, 176 Neb. 295, 125 N.W.2d 918
(1964) (mentally defective offender with I.Q. of 64 presumed sane).
48 See State v. Weind, 50 Ohio St. 2d 224, 364 N.E.2d 224 (1977) (the possibility of an
acute, short-lived psychotic break is not enough to support the existence of this mitigating
factor); State v. Lockett, 49 Ohio St. 2d 48, 358 N.E.2d 1062 (1976) (borderline mental
retardate under the influence of methadone and subject to undue influence of others); State
v. Edwards, 49 Ohio St. 2d 31, 358 N.E.2d 1051 (1976) (defendant was below average in
intelligence, but educational deficiency does not equate with mental deficiency); State v.
Royster, 48 Ohio St. 2d 381, 358 N.E.2d 616 (1976) (defendant had an I.Q. of 54; however,
the testimony of the psychiatrist did not equate I.Q. with mental deficiency); State v. Bell,
48 Ohio St. 2d 270, 358 N.E.2d 556 (1976) (rejection of claim that minor defendant is per se
mentally deficient); State v. Black, 48 Ohio St. 2d 262, 358 N.E.2d 551 (1976) (the incapac-
ity must be the primary producing cause of the offense); State v. Bayless, 48 Ohio St. 2d 73,
357 N.E.2d 1035 (1976) (mental deficiency does not include the behavioral and emotional
abnormalities claimed by defense).
"' See State v. Rogers, No. 81-6906, trial op. at 18 (C.P. Lucas County 1982). In Rogers,
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1983
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
tunately, it seems likely that mental retardates will slip through the
mitigation net even though there are good reasons why this group should
receive some mitigating consideration."
Third, benefiting from this mitigating factor is made more difficult if
the offender resorts to the insanity defense. This proposition holds true
regardless of whether the individual is suffering from a mental disease or
mental defect. Essentially, a jury or three-judge panel is asked to estab-
lish this mitigating factor at the sentencing stage after it has already re-
jected the defense of insanity at the trial stage. A problem for the defense
is distinguishing the insanity defense from this mitigating factor. This is
no small task, as the difference between Ohio's insanity test and mitigat-
ing factor three is minimal." Furthermore, this problem is exacerbated
by the need to maintain the credibility of psychiatric experts during the
sentencing phase.52 The same experts who testified that the defendant
was insane will probably have to testify again during the sentencing
phase. If the jury did not believe the experts' testimony that the defen-
dant did not have the capacity to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of the law, it would be hard-pressed to find that he lacked sub-
stantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.
the evidence depicted a man "who at the time of the incidents in question was holding a job
and worked regularly; who drew a paycheck, lived alone and cared for his own basic needs;
who possessed a driver's license, a fishing license, purchased his own groceries and did his
own laundry." Id. trial op. at 17-18.
50 There are three ways in which a mental retardate's defective intelligence places him at
a disadvantage in appreciating the significance of his acts:
(1) [Tlhe retardate's impaired intelligence may manifest itself as an inability fully
to understand legal rules, or the rationale underlying them . . .. [(2)] [T]he
retardate is more prone to commit a crime than a normal person because he mis-
perceives surrounding circumstances and consequently tends to react immediately
and violently to the urges of the moment. . . .[(3)] [R]etardates' native suggesti-
bility may lead them to participate in illegal activity out of a desire to please their
cohorts, and so may reflect adversely on the existence of criminal intent.
Leibman & Shepard, Guiding Capital Sentencing Discretion Beyond the "Boiler Plate":
Mental Disorder as a Mitigating Factor, 66 GEo. L.J. 757, 826-27 (1978).
"1 Ohio Legislative Service Commission, Proposed Ohio Criminal Code 59 (1971) ("an
analysis of the Staten rule reveals that, substantively, it is equivalent to the American Law
Institute's insanity defense"); Death Penalty, supra note 3, at 647 n.157; Note, The Pro-
posed Affirmative Defenses Of Forced Perpetration, Entrapment, Intoxication and Sanity,
33 OHIO ST. L.J. 397, 417 (1972) (the Staten test is very similar to the Model Penal Code's
formulation). See also State v. Wilcox, 70 Ohio St. 2d 182, 436 N.E.2d 523 (1982) (insanity
standard is "arguably less expansive" than Model Penal Code's standard); S. GLUECK,
MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW, 226-27 (1925) (no medical distinction between
lack of substantial capacity and no capacity).
" An ancillary problem is the possibility that the attorney will also lose his credibility in
the sentencing phase after having lost the trial on the merits. See Motion to Declare Ohio
Revised Code Unconstitutional in Violation of the United States and Ohio Constitutions at
7-10, State v. Jenkins, No. CR 168784 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1982) (hereinafter cited as
Motion); Brief for Appellant at 106-07, State v. Jenkins, No. CR 168784 (C.P. Cuyahoga
County 1982) (hereinafter cited as Appellant's Brief).
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An illustration of the inherent problems in pleading insanity and subse-
quently relying on mitigating factor three is presented in State v. Rog-
ers.5 3 In Rogers, the trial jury sentenced the defendant to death after
finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating fac-
tors. In its treatment of mitigating factor three, the trial court stated:
In arriving at a conclusion as to mitigating factor three, this
Court takes great solace and guidance from the decision of this
jury when it determined the guilt of the defendant and elected to
disregard, or find as totally insufficient, the evidence suggesting
that the defendant was insane at the time of the commission of
the offense. While mitigating factor three as found in 2929.04(B)
does not absolutely correspond to the test for insanity, it cer-
tainly comes so close as to allow this Court to take guidance
from the jury's decision."'
Clearly, the court should have taken no "solace" or "guidance" from the
fact that the jury found the defendant sane at the trial stage. The jury
was not asked to determine whether the defendant lacked substantial ca-
pacity, a lesser standard than the standard for insanity. Just as a rejec-
tion of murder does not preclude a finding of manslaughter, the rejection
of the insanity defense bears no relation to the defendant's lack of sub-
stantial capacity. During its discussion of this mitigating factor, the court
stated that it disregarded the testimony of two defense experts, a psy-
chologist and a psychiatrist," and instead relied on the testimony of the
state psychiatrist. His testimony pointed to the fact that the defendant
had the "presence of mind" to use certain instruments and devices to
make his attack more possible, which suggested that the defendant's con-
duct was "purposeful" and that he had the "knowledge" that his acts
were wrong.56 The court concluded that there was "no evidence" that the
defendant, because of mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capac-
ity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.5 7 Thus, the
court, in effect, applied the insanity test 58 at the mitigation hearing and
concluded that the defendant was sane.
The trial judge in State v. Kiser,5 on the other hand, found mitigating
No. 81-6906 (C.P. Lucas County 1982).
Id. trial op. at 19 (emphasis added).
Id. at 20-21.
I6 d. at 20.
57 Id.
' The trial judge's discussion of "presence of mind," "knowledge," and "purposeful,"
suggests that the presence of these factors negated the existence of mitigating factor three.
An Ohio court has stated that "[i]t is obvious that one may commit a purposeful act not
knowing it to be wrong, or commit such a purposeful act, even though the actor knows the
act to be wrong, but lacks the ability to refrain from doing it." State v. Howze, 66 Ohio App.
2d 41, 46, 420 N.E.2d 131, 135 (9th Dist. 1979) (Summit County).
" No. 82-CR69 (C.P. Ross County 1983).
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factor three to exist despite the jury's rejection of the defendant's in-
sanity defense. The jury had recommended the death penalty, but the
judge found that the state had not met its burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mit-
igating factors. In its treatment of mitigating factor three, the court relied
on a report submitted by the state's psychiatrist. Although the psychia-
trist had testified at the trial stage that the defendant was sane, his re-
port submitted at the sentencing phase stated that a combination of in-
toxication and depression left the defendant significantly impaired at the
time of the commission of the offense.6 0 The psychiatrist concluded that
the defendant lacked, to a significant degree, the capacity to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law." It is unknown whether the jury:
1) did not believe the report; 2) determined that significant impairment
was not a lack of substantial capacity; or 3) established the existence of
mitigating factor three, but found that the aggravating circumstances pre-
sent in the case outweighed mitigating factor three and other mitigating
factors present. The trial judge, however, did rely on the report and
found that at the time of committing the offense, the defendant suffered
from "alcoholism and depression, a mental disease or defect, and as a
result thereof he lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law."62
Thus in two cases involving insanity defenses under the new capital
statute, the sentencing jury was unable or unwilling to distinguish the
insanity test from statutory mitigating factor three.6 3 In the one case
where the judge did find mitigating factor three to exist, it was, ironically,
the state's psychiatrist who established the fact that the defendant lack-
ed substantial capacity at the time of the offense.
The jury is asked to make a difficult, subtle determination that miti-
gating factor three exists after it has previously rejected the insanity de-
fense. A better approach would allow the defendant to elect to have miti-
o Id. trial op. at 8.
' Id.
e' Id. at 8-9.
63 In an additional case a jury rejected the defendant's claim of insanity as well as statu-
tory mitigating factor three. See State v. Steffen, No. B-824004 (C.P. Hamilton County
1983). In Steffen, the court stated that it was satisfied that the evidence reflected "conclu-
sively that the defendant has never suffered from a mental disease or defect which would
have prevented the defendant from distinguishing right from wrong or would have pre-
vented him from conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law .... [i]n other
words the defendant has never suffered from any psychosis." Id. trial op. at 16. In State v.
Spisak, No. CR-176651 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1983), a defense psychiatrist nullified the
defense of insanity by testifying at the trial stage that the defendant was schizotypal, but
that such disorder did not constitute a mental disease. The Plain Dealer, July 12, 1983, at
1-A, col. 1. Spisak's mental condition also did not meet the requirements of mitigating fac-
tor three. Spisak, trial op. at 8-9; see supra note 38.
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gating factor three established at the trial stage. The defendant could
then present all his evidence regarding insanity and mitigating factor
three at the trial stage. The jury would have the opportunity first to ac-
cept or reject the insanity defense. Only after it had rejected the insanity
defense would it be allowed to consider whether or not the defendant
lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of
the law. In this way, the credibility of the defense witnesses would be
maintained. The defense experts could still argue that the defendant was
insane. Since the insanity defense encompasses mitigating factor three,
the jury could find the defendant sane but still substantially impaired,
without serious damage to the experts' credibility. Furthermore, the trial
judge, pursuant to his duty to review a penalty of death, would still be
able to find that mitigating factor three existed and consider it in the
weighing process.
The best approach would preclude the death sentence altogether for an
offender who has established mitigating factor three. The degree of
mental capacity required to meet the stringent test of this mitigating fac-
tor is so near that of the insanity test that executing an offender who has
established the existence of mitigating factor three may be a violation of
the eighth and fourteenth amendments. The Supreme Court, in Coker v.
Georgia," overturned the death penalty as a punishment for the rape of
an adult woman. The Court subsequently, in Enmund v. Florida," over-
turned a penalty of death as a punishment for one who did not kill, at-
tempt to kill, or intend to kill. The question in the latter case was not
whether death was disproportionate as a penalty for murder, but rather
whether death was disproportionate to the culpability of the offender. 6 It
is important to note that mitigating factors are employed to reduce the
culpability of the offender. Thus, death may not be imposed as a punish-
ment for an offender who has sufficiently reduced his culpability to war-
rant a lesser punishment. In rejecting the penalty of death in Coker, the
Supreme Court looked to the legislative judgments of other states as an
indicator of society's evolving standards of punishment for various
crimes." In Enmund, the Court also looked to legislative judgments as an
indicator of whether states were executing offenders who neither took life,
attempted to take life, nor intended to take life." A similar analysis will
be undertaken here, to determine whether states are currently affording
the mentally impaired a mitigating standard that will adequately ensure
that their disability will be taken into account by the sentencing
authority.
" 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
" 458 U.S. __, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982).
" Id. at __, 102 S. Ct. at 3377.
67 433 U.S. at 593-96.
" 458 U.S. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 3372-74.
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Under the prior statute, the legislature precluded the death sentence if
a defendant could establish that the offense was a product of psychosis or
mental deficiency.6 9 These terms are virtually synonymous with mental
disease or defect, as used in either the insanity test or mitigating factor
three. 0
Thirty-six states currently authorize a death penalty. Of these, fifteen
states 1 have adopted the Model Penal Code's test for insanity. In these
states, an offender with the identical mental condition as that required
under Ohio's mitigating factor three is not guilty of the underlying
crime 7 2 and needless to say, is not subject to possible execution. In the
remaining states authorizing capital punishment, many expressly provide
mitigating consideration to mentally impaired offenders. The standards
that these states utilize to measure the impairment of the offender appear
much less stringent than Ohio's mitigating factor three. Two states re-
quire a lesser standard of "significant impairment.""3 One state precludes
the death penalty if "significant impairment" is established . 7 Two states
require only "impairment" as a result of mental disease, defect, or intoxi-
cation.7 5 Two states require only "impairment" of capacity.
76
Five states require that capacity be "substantially impaired. 7 7 How-
ever, the question is not phrased in the negative as is Ohio's standard,
and there is no requirement that the capacity be substantially impaired
due to mental disease or defect. In one of these five states, death is pre-
cluded if this factor is "sufficiently established. '78 Furthermore, in four of
the five states the death penalty is discretionary; the jury need not rec-
69 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (Page 1975) (amended 1981).
70 Death Penalty, supra note 3, at 645-46; see supra note 51.
71 People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 583 P.2d 1318, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1978); Common-
wealth v. Mchoul, 352 Mass. 544, 226 N.E.2d 566 (1967); Terry v. Commonwealth, 371
S.W.2d 862 (Ky. 1963); ALA. CODE § 13A-3-1(a) (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-601(1) (1977);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-13 (Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-2(a) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-6(a) (Burns 1978); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN.
§ 12-107(1)(2)(1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.030(1) (Vernon Supp. 1983); Graham v. State,
547 S.W.2d 531 (Tenn. 1977); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01 (Vernon 1979); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-2-305(1) (1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4801(1) (1974); WvO. STAT. § 7-11-
304(a) (1977).
" ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-2(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-84) (guilty but mentally ill).
73 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G)(1) (Supp. 1981); VA. CODE § 19.2-264.4(B)(iv)
(Supp. 1982).
71 COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(5)(b) (1978).
70 LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5(e) (Supp. 1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-
2523(2)(g)(1979).
70 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-6(C) (Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(6) (1978).
17 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(f) (West Supp. 1983); MIsS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(6)(f)
(Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304(4) (1981); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(e)(3)
(Purdon 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(6) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982).
'8 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-305 (1981).
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ommend death.79
Among states not adopting the Model Penal Code's definition of in-
sanity, the largest category is comprised of seven states; these jurisdic-
tions do not list any statutory mitigating factors. 0 In these states it
stands to reason that evidence may be proffered of mere impairment of
capacity, alcohol impairment, or any other degree of impairment. In all of
these states the death penalty is discretionary.8'
There is only one state, Washington, with a provision identical to
Ohio's mitigating factor three.82 However, Washington does not utilize a
"weighing" method. A unanimous jury must give an affirmative answer to
a question which focuses not on the aggravating circumstances, but on
the lack of mitigating factors. 83
The examination of statutes in other states reveals a significantly
greater protection of mentally-impaired offenders than Ohio's statute af-
fords. While many states do not preclude death if mental incapacity is
established, they at least provide a lesser standard that allows the sen-
tencer to establish and consider the mental impairment of the offender."
In the group of states not utilizing the Model Penal Code's test for in-
sanity, eleven of the thirteen states which list mitigating factors also in-
clude, as a mitigating factor, the existence of an "extreme emotional or
mental disturbance."85 In these states a significantly-impaired offender
7 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2)(c) (West Supp. 1983); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(2)(c)(Supp. 1982); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(f)(1),. (2) (Purdon 1982); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 16-3-20(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982).
80 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(c)(4) (1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-31 (1982); IDAHO
CODE § 19-2515(b) (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.552 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630.1(1974) (the statute does not mention mitigating factors, but Lockett requires courts to con-
sider them despite their absence); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10 (West 1983); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-1 (Supp. 1982).
81 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d) (1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-31 (1982); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 175.554(2)(c) (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630.1 (1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,§ 701.11 (West 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-4 (1979).
82 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.070(6) (Supp. 1982).
s WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.060(4) (Supp. 1982). "Having in mind the crime of
which the defendant has been found guilty, are you convinced beyond a reasonable doubt
that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency?" Id.
" Massachusetts was one of the last states to adopt a capital punishment statute. In com-
parison to Ohio's mitigating factor three, Massachusetts' corresponding mitigating factor is
an excellent example of a standard which allows the sentencer to consider the mental im-
pairment of the offender. The statute lists as a mitigating factor:
[Tihe offense was committed while the capacity of the defendant to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
the law was impaired as a result of a mental disease or defect, organic brain dam-
age, emotional illness brought on by stress or prescribed medication, intoxication,
or legal or illegal drug use by the defendant which was insufficient to establish a
defense to the murder but which substantially affected his judgment ....
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 69(b)(4) (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1983).I8 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(b) (West Supp. 1983); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
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could receive mitigating consideration from both factors, while in Ohio
the same offender could not benefit at all. It is true that in Ohio mitigat-
ing factor seven allows consideration of any other relevant factor prof-
fered by the defendant. But the question of whether a jury can be ex-
pected to consider the mental impairment of the offender as relevant
under mitigating factor seven after rejecting it under mitigating factor
three is a problematic one.
Many other states provide further protection to mentally impaired of-
fenders by allowing the jury to recommend a life sentence despite the
numerical count of aggravating and mitigating factors.86 Whether or not
such complete jury discretion is beneficial in all cases, it is at least clear
that this type of provision reduces the chances that a seriously-impaired
individual will be executed.
Ohio's only statutory safeguard for the mentally impaired is mitigating
factor three. The similarities between this factor and the insanity test
make it likely that an offender will first plead the latter before attempt-
ing to benefit from the former. The same similarities also make it un-
likely that the sentencer will find the mitigating factor to exist after the
insanity defense is rejected. But in those cases where mitigating factor
three is found to exist, death should be precluded in all cases. The lack of
any other safeguards in the statute, combined with the stringent standard
of mitigating factor three, indicates that Ohio will execute offenders who
would be considered legally insane in fifteen states" and subject to far
greater protection in all others. Such a punishment, under the rationale
of Enmund v. Florida,"s is unconstitutional.
B. The Youth of the Offender
The fourth mitigating factor provides that the "youth of the of-
fender" 89 be considered by the sentencing authority. However, "youth" is
art. 905.5(b) (Supp. 1983); MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(6)(b) (Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-18-304(2) (1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-6(D) (1981) (merely under the "in-
fluence of mental or emotional disturbance"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2)(c) (1979); N.C.
GN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(2) (Supp. 1981) (merely under the "influence of mental or emo-
tional disturbance"); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(E)(2) (Purdon 1982); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-20(C)(b)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982) (merely under the "influence of mental or
emotional disturbance"); VA. CODE § 19.2-264(4)(B)(ii) (Supp. 1982); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 10.95.070.(2) (Supp. 1982) (under the "influence of extreme mental disturbance").
88 See supra notes 79, 81.
87 See supra note 71.
458 U.S. - , 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982).
88 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(4) (Page 1982). Some states have made "age" of the
offender a mitigating factor. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(g) (West Supp. 1982); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(6)(g) (Supp. 1982); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(e)(4) (Purdon
1982). Thus, an elderly offender may receive mitigation under this factor. In Ohio the of-
fender's advanced age could still be considered as a mitigating factor as part of the history,
character, and background of the offender, as well as relevant to statutory factor seven.
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left undefined in the Ohio Revised Code.90 Ohio has included in its capi-
tal statute a provision precluding the sentencer from imposing the death
sentence on a person under the age of eighteen at the time of the commis-
sion of the offense." Thus, youth as a mitigating factor can apply only to
offenders eighteen or older and naturally should weigh most heavily in
favor of those offenders closest to age eighteen.
Unfortunately, the indication is that "youth of the offender" does not
carry a great deal of mitigating weight. In State v. Penix,9 the offender
was eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of the offense.
Despite his youth, the court stated that "it should be viewed in the light
of the Defendant's previous years of criminal activity. . . which indicate
an emerging habitual criminal, immune to rehabilitation."93 However, no-
where does the statute state that a court may view a mitigating factor
established by the defendant in light of his prior record. A similar analy-
sis regarding "youth" was carried out in State v. Glenn.9 The offender
was nineteen, but the court failed to establish youth as a mitigating factor
because the "evidence was that the defendant planned and put into exe-
cution a scheme to free his brother from jail and to kill, if necessary, an
officer." 95 In State v. Byrd,96 the court, examining mitigating factor four,
found that the defendant was nineteen years old at the time of the trial.
After noting that the defendant was the oldest nineteen-year-old that the
judge had ever seen, the court concluded that there was "no evidence to
suggest that his age was a factor that should be taken into account in
mitigation of the sentence of death."9 7
One court has adopted a different interpretation of mitigating factor
four. In State v. Kiser,9 8 a twenty-three-year-old offender received con-
sideration of mitigation under this factor. The court viewed the age of the
offender as independent of the issue of guilt. The conclusion was that
"youth can be defined only in terms of perspective."99 The offender was
90 See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.01 (Page 1982) (persons of the age of eigh-
teen are of full age for "all purposes").
Id. § 2929.03(D)(1).
92 No. 82-CR-241 (C.P. Clark County 1983).
" Id. trial op. at 4.
No. 81 CR 933 (C.P. Portage County 1982).
" Id. trial op. at 4.
90 No. B-831662 (C.P. Hamilton County 1983).
97 Id. trial op. at 10. See State v. Steffen, No. B-824004 (C.P. Hamilton County 1983). In
Steffen, the defendant was 23 years old at the time of trial. The court concluded that there
was "absolutely no evidence to suggest that [the defendant] was a youthful offender or that
his age was a factor that should be taken into account in mitigation of the sentence of death.
This factor was not present." Id. trial op. at 11. In State v. Thompson, No. 82 L 15216
(C.P. Licking County 1983), the court found that the defendant's age of 23 was both an
aggravating and a mitigating factor. Id. trial op. at 14, 15.
" No. 82-CR69 (C.P. Ross County 1983).
" Id. trial op. at 9.
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less mature than a middle-aged man and therefore youthful.' °
The legislature's inclusion of "youth" as a mitigating factor must mean
more than the guilt or prior record of the offender. None of the mitigat-
ing factors will excuse the guilt of the offender; they may only reduce the
punishment for the criminal act. If "youth" does not apply to eighteen-
and nineteen-year-olds, this factor will be quite useless.
C. Lack of Significant History
The fifth mitigating factor authorizes the sentencer to consider the of-
fender's "lack of a significant history of prior criminal convictions and
delinquency adjudications.' 10 ' The interpretation of "significant history"
by the courts will be the major issue to be resolved before the efficacy of
this factor is determined. Significant history could be interpreted several
ways: 1) the relative significance of the prior conviction; 2) the numerical
count of prior convictions; 3) the numerical count of prior convictions of
the same type or nature that led to the charge in the pending case;'0 2 or
4) the time span over which the criminal convictions extended.'03
These categories, of course, are not mutually exclusive. They do, how-
ever, represent four potentially distinct situations in which the sen-
tencer's determination of mitigation will revolve around the interpreta-
tion of "significant history." If the courts construe the particular focus of
this factor as precluding consideration of mitigation where an offender
has prior significant convictions, then to some extent mitigation should
accrue to an offender with a long but relatively insignificant record. A less
stringent standard would result from a judicial focus on the number of
prior convictions.
The interpretation apparently favored by the American Law Institute
100 Id.
'0o' OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(5) (Page 1982). C.f. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.141(6)(a)(West Supp. 1983) (lack of a significant history of criminal activity is to be
considered as a mitigating factor). This type of wording negates the establishment of this
factor when the defendant is confronted with uncorroborated confessions to various crimes,
see Smith v. State, 407 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1982), or evidence of criminal activity for which no
convictions resulted. See Washington v. State, 362 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1978). But see State v.
Holtan, 197 Neb. 544, 250 N.W.2d 876 (1977) (significant history means meaningful history,
not inconsequential history of criminal activity).
'0' State v. Rogers, No. 81-6906, trial op. at 12 (C.P. Lucas County 1982).
'0o' Florida courts apparently interpret "significant history" to mean the numerical count
of the convictions, the time span over which the criminal convictions extended, or the signif-
icance of the conviction. See Simmons v. State, 419 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 1982) (defendant's
robbery convictions and numerous misdemeanor convictions, several arrests, and two
charges of parole violation constituted significant history); Washington v. State, 362 So. 2d
658 (Fla. 1978) (defendant had carried on a course of burglaries, and had possessed stolen
properties for a significant period of time); Douglas v. State, 328 So. 2d 18 (Fla.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 871 (1976) (felony convictions).
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is a combination of the first and fourth interpretations above. 10 ' The
Model Penal Code states that "the word 'significant' was inserted into the
tentative draft formulation lest a trivial and remote conviction be con-
strued to bar consideration of an otherwise law-abiding life as a mitigat-
ing factor."1 °0 However, what types of convictions will be regarded as triv-
ial or as significant is unknown. Some states have denied consideration of
mitigation when the earlier conviction was for a crime of violence.,," This
approach admits this factor for misdemeanor convictions, but it lacks the
flexibility to allow the sentencer to overlook a remote conviction of, for
example, attempted robbery.
The Ohio trial courts appear split on the interpretation and scope of a
lack of significant history of prior criminal convictions. Two Ohio trial
courts have apparently adopted the significance of the prior conviction as
the particular focus of "lack of a significant history." In State v. For-
ney,'0 7 a three-judge panel determined that the defendant lacked a signif-
icant history of criminal convictions despite a prior conviction for aggra-
vated robbery. 108 In State v. Kiser,'0 9 the court found that the defendant
had been adjudged a delinquent child by virtue of his apprehension for
breaking and entering at age fourteen. Furthermore, the defendant had
twice been convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol, and once
been convicted of having an intoxicating beverage on or about his person
while in control of a motor vehicle. 10 The court, citing the Forney deci-
sion, found that the defendant lacked a significant history of prior crimi-
nal convictions or delinquency adjudications."'
In State v. Glenn,"' the court phrased, the question as whether the
defendant lacked a sufficient history of prior criminal convictions. The
court noted that the defendant's record included delinquency convictions
as a juvenile and misdemeanor convictions as an adult, but found that
these did not constitute a "substantial history of prior criminal
activity."" "
'I" The Model Penal Code's formulation is apparently a combination of the time span and
the significance of the prior convictions. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4)(a) (1980).
105 Id.
,06 E.g., MD. CRIM. LAW. CODE ANN. § 413(G)(1) (1982). Crime of violence means "abduc-
tion, arson, escape, kidnapping, manslaughter, except involuntary manslaughter, mayhem,
murder, robbery or sexual offense in the first or second degree, or attempt to commit any of
these offenses, or the use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or another crime of
violence." Id.
,0" No. 824443 (C.P. Summit County 1982).
'08 Id. trial op. at 2.
109 No. 82-CR69 (C.P. Ross County 1983).
'10 Id. trial op. at 10.
111 Id.
No. 81 CR 933 (C.P. Portage County 1982).
ns Id. trial op. at 4. The court's statement regarding the relative mitigating weight of this
factor illustrates the difficulty of establishing such weight after it has been determined that
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The trial courts that have rejected mitigating consideration for prior
criminal convictions and delinquent adjudications have done so by focus-
ing on the acts and the time span over which these acts extended. For
example, the court in State v. Rogers." stated that the defendant had a
significant history of convictions "for acts of the same or similar nature"
and that these convictions extended over a significant period of time."'
Likewise, in State v. Byrd"6 and State v. Steffen,' 7 the courts applied
this standard in rejecting consideration of mitigating factor number five.
The court in Byrd found that the offender "had a significant history of
convictions and adjudications of delinquency for a variety of acts and
that these convictions and adjudications of delinquency extend over a sig-
nificant period of time.""' 8 The opinion was silent as to the nature of the
criminal convictions and delinquency adjudications. The court in Steffen
recited precisely the same language in rejecting consideration of mitigat-
ing factor number five. 1" 9 The Rogers, Byrd and Steffen decisions regard-
ing this factor will allow the appellate courts to determine the permissi-
ble scope for interpreting lack of significant history of prior convictions.
The appellate courts should interpret this factor to allow consideration of
mitigation to all persons except those with prior convictions of significant
crimes extending over a substantial period of time. This approach would
not preclude the sentencer from giving little mitigating weight to an of-
fender with a long record of insignificant convictions. It would, however,
force the sentencer to establish the existence of this factor at the outset.
D. Any Other Factors
The final mitigating factor authorizes the sentencer to consider "any
other factors that are relevant to the issue of whether the offender should
be sentenced to death."'"2 This factor may constitute the most important
one for the defendant in attempting to mitigate the death penalty. It pur-
ports to allow the defendant to proffer a wide range of evidence on the
reasons why he should not suffer the death penalty. In fact, the following
provision of the statute states that "[tihe defendant shall be given great
latitude in the presentation of evidence of [the seven statutory factors]
and of any other factors in mitigation of the imposition of the sentence of
this factor exists. "The court is of the opinion that it is not a substantial history of prior
criminal activity but certainly is sufficient to show the vicious tendency of the defendant,
John Glenn." Id.
14 No. 81-6906 (C.P. Lucas County 1982).
,15 Id. trial op. at 11-12.
11 No. B-831662 (C.P. Hamilton County 1983).
" No. B-824004 (C.P. Hamilton County 1983).
"a No. B-831662, trial op. at 10.
'1 The Steffen court concluded that the "prior history of criminal activity would be more
aggravating than mitigating." No. B-824004, trial op. at 11.
"" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(7) (Page 1982).
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death."' 1 Thus, the only limiting qualification written into this factor,
and which must be assumed to be implicit in the above formulation, is
that evidence be relevant to the issue of whether the offender should be
sentenced to death.
Relevant evidence was discussed in Lockett v. Ohio'12 when Chief Jus-
tice Burger stated that "the sentencer . . . [should] not be precluded
from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of the defendant's
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.' 23 In a foot-
note following that passage, the Chief Justice stated that "[n]othing in
this opinion limits the traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrel-
evant, evidence not bearing on the defendant's character, prior record, or
the circumstances of his offense.' ' 24
Other types of evidence are relevant to the sentencer's decision. How-
ever, in cases where the defendant has proffered evidence of the non-de-
terrent effect of capital punishment, the courts have generally excluded
that evidence on the basis of Lockett's exclusive treatment of mitigating
factors pertaining to the character, record and circumstances of the of-
fense. 25 The lone Ohio trial court where evidence of non-deterrence was
proffered followed this interpretation. In State v. Jenkins,2 the trial
judge ruled that a witness could testify only from his own personal knowl-
edge "with respect to the history, character and background of the of-
fender."' 27 However, the court in State v. Mapes 28 rejected the argu-
ments of counsel that capital punishment was not a deterrent to further
commission of crimes by stating that "no expert testimony was offered to
support this bare allegation.' ' 29
The statutory provision can be interpreted differently. The preface to
the subsection detailing the mitigating factors states that the sentencer
should consider "the nature and circumstances of the offense . . . and all
of the following [statutory) factors."'2 0 If the statute is given literal ef-
fect, mitigating factor seven must allow the admission of relevant evi-
121 Id. § 2929.04(C).
122 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
123 Id. at 604 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 604 n.12.
", Franklin v. State, 245 Ga. 141, 263 S.E.2d 666, cert. denied, 447 U.S. 930 (1980); Hous-
ton v. State, 593 S.W.2d 267 (Tenn. 1980); State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 257 S.E.2d 55, cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 941 (1979). But see Davis v. State, 241 Ga. 376, 247 S.E.2d 45 (1978) (pros-
ecution failed to object to testimony of witnesses).
12' No. CR168784 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1982).
1"7 Appellant's Brief, supra note 52, at 63.
No. CR-181703 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1983).
129 Id. trial op. at 5. The defendant in State v. Tyler, No. 181132B (C.P. Cuyahoga
County 1983), argued in his testimony and statement to the jury that the death sentence
was not a deterrent to crime. Id. trial op. at 3.
'30 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (Page 1982) (emphasis added).
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dence different from character, record, or offense evidence. The best
reading of the statute would allow evidence of character, record, and cir-
cumstances of the offense as well as evidence of the non-deterrent effect
of capital punishment and of the rehabilitative prospects of the offender.
Notwithstanding a statutory construction allowing admission of non-
deterrent evidence, support can be found in Supreme Court opinions for
such admission. The Supreme Court has recognized that deterrence and
retribution are the principal social purposes of the death penalty. 3 ' In
Enmunds v. Florida,'3 Justice White stated that "[u]nless the death pen-
alty when applied to those in Enmunds' position measurably contributes
to one or both of these goals, 'it is nothing more than the purposeless and
needless imposition of pain and suffering and hence an unconstitutional
punishment.' "' Implicit in this formulation is the relationship between
retribution and deterrence on the one hand, and the death penalty on the
other. If this relationship is negated, the death penalty must not be im-
posed. A legislative decree that execution promotes deterrence is not
enough.34 The judiciary in this age of individualized sentencing must be
13' Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976). See State v. Meyer, 163 Ohio St. 279, 126
N.E.2d 585 (1955) ("the object of a criminal penalty is to punish the accused, deter others
from crime, and to protect the public"). But see In re Lamb, 34 Ohio App. 2d 85, 296
N.E.2d 280, (8th Dist. 1973) (Cuyahoga County). In Lamb the court of appeals stated "it is
now clear that '[rietribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Refor-
mation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal jurispru-
dence.'" Id. at 88, 296 N.E.2d at 284 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949)).
... 458 U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982).
133 Id. at 3377 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
"' The Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), stated that "[tihe value
of capital punishment as a deterrent of crime is a complex factual issue the resolution of
which properly rests with the legislatures, which can evaluate the results of statistical stud-
ies in terms of their own local conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is not
available to the courts." Id. at 186. However, the Ohio legislature has never made a determi-
nation that the death penalty indeed deters crime or is a useful tool to express the state's
sense of moral outrage at the crime of murder. See THE OHIO DEATH PENALTY TASK FORCE,
OHIO DEATH PENALTY MANUAL 11-46 (1981). Moreover, one study concluded that "the pre-
sent analysis of Ohio's experience with capital punishment provides no justification for rein-
stating the death penalty as an effective means for dealing with the state's murder prob-
lem." Bailey, The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty for Murder in Ohio: A Time
Series Analysis, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 51, 70 (1979). Even if the legislature had made such a
determination, it still must defer to the commands of the eighth amendment. See Enmund
v. Florida, 458 U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 3376 (1982). See, e.g., Hertz & Weisberg, In
Mitigation of the Penalty of Death, Lockett v. Ohio and the Capital Defendant's Right to
Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 317, 368-69 (1981). If the
penological justification can be questioned in Enmunds, why can it not be questioned also
in other types of cases? Specifically, in Jenkins, the defendant sought to proffer evidence of
the reduced life expectancy of a paraplegic. See Appellant's Brief, supra note 52, at 64. The
defendant also argued that "[tihe jury should have been permitted to consider there was
nothing to be gained by executing a paralyzed man, especially when he suffered paralysis as
the result of his own criminal actions." Id. Notwithstanding its relevance to Jenkins' charac-
ter, history, and circumstances of the offense, this evidence is directly relevant to whether
[Vol. 32:263
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sure that in relation to every defendant a death penalty promotes the
twin social goals of deterrence and retribution." 5
At a minimum, it would seem appropriate for all offenders to proffer
evidence that executing them would not further the twin goals of deter-
rence and retribution.'"6 Moreover, such an interpretation would not re-
quire a change in the statutory language. The provision is broad enough
to encompass that meaning in its present form.
In arguing that retributive and deterrent goals are not furthered by ex-
ecuting the individual offender, there is much additional evidence that is
relevant to the sentencer's decision. The following evidentiary concepts,
relevant to retribution, could be proffered: 1) eyewitness accounts of an
execution;1 3 7 2) the concept that where there is life, there is hope;' 38
3) the religious interpretation of the phrase "an eye for an eye; ' ,
4) reasons why the sentencer should be merciful;"'4 and 5) reasons why
incarceration for life would adequately fulfill society's retributive objec-
tive."" The Ohio capital plan does not allow the sentencing authority to
act mercifully, i.e., to grant life where there are no mitigating factors, or
where the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors. 4"
Thus, in State v. Jenkins 4 s the judge stated that
[clontrary to popular belief and contrary to the intimations con-
tained in the statement of the defendant and the arguments of
counsel, neither the trial jury nor I, the Judge, could consider sen-
timents such as sympathy, mercy or compassion in determining
the primary issue of whether the aggravating circumstances out-
society's sense of outrage has been adequately redressed.
" See generally Liebman & Shepard, supra note 50, at 785.
136 See id.
131 Shriner v. State, 386 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 1980); Franklin v. State, 245 Ga. 141, 263 S.E.2d
666, cert. denied, 447 U.S. 930 (1980).
"I See Appellant's Brief, supra note 52, at 65.
"39 H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 372 (3d ed. 1982) ("a closer study of these
earliest chapters of the Bible indicates the death penalty is not so much a requirement as a
limitation").
14o See Houston v. State, 593 S.W.2d 267 (Tenn. 1980) (testimony on effect of execution
on parents and on society was excluded); Appellant's Brief, supra note 52, at 8. But see,
State v. Rogers, No. 81-6906 (C.P. Lucas County 1982). "For the court to allow its personal
[merciful] sentiment to intervene and play a role in its judgment would in effect, be tanta-
mount to disregarding the law as written in order to avoid an unpleasant decision." Id. trial
op. at 9. In State v. Byrd, No. B-831662 (C.P. Hamilton County 1983), the court noted that
the defendant had aided a young child who had fallen into a frozen creek. The court stated
that "[tihis being the only socially redeeming act of the defendant's life offered or otherwise
shown by the evidence it does not rise to the level of a mitigating factor." Id. trial op. at 13.
"' See Appellant's Brief, supra note 52, at 64-65; Hertz & Weisberg, supra note 134, at
369-71.
,41 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(2) (Page 1982).
"' No. CR168784 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1982).
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weigh the mitigating factors.""'
One might consider whether mercy is a built-in component of Ohio's capi-
tal statute. What prevents a jury from reaching a verdict of life in prison,
in spite of factors apparently calling for the death penalty? In State v.
Shields,14 5 no evidence of statutory mitigating factors was presented, yet
the jury, apparently moved by pleas of compassion and mercy, returned a
verdict of life imprisonment. 4 Even the judge's weighing of the aggravat-
ing and mitigating factors may merely be an exercise in merciful, subjec-
tive decision-making.
The defendant should additionally be allowed to proffer evidence fo-
cusing on other concepts, such as that: 1) murderers have a compara-
tively low recidivism rate; 47 2) the sentence of death would be dispropor-
tionate to sentences rendered in similar cases;148 and 3) it is more costly
to execute an offender than it is to imprison him for the rest of his life.' 40
The critics of this type of wide-open sentencing consideration argue
that the approach invites a return to the pre-Furman v. Georgia 50 days,
when the sentencer exercised so much discretion that the penalty was im-
posed "wantonly and freakishly and so infrequently" that any death sen-
tence constituted cruel and unusual punishment.'' However, more guid-
ance would seem preferable to less guidance. The Furman opinions
regarded unguided and unrestrained sentencing discretion as a violation
of the eighth amendment. 52 But a statute which would allow considera-
tion '5 of all types of evidence, including evidence of retribution and de-
'44 Id. trial op. at 8.
'" No. 173004-B (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1982).
146 Telephone interview with T. Keane, attorney for defendant (Jan. 25, 1983).
147 See Appellant's Brief, supra note 52, at 64 n.19; H. BEDAU, supra note 139, at 175-80.
A related aspect is the offender's rehabilitative prospects. The Supreme Court has stated
"the sentencing judge is obligated to make his decision on the basis, among others, of pre-
dictions regarding the convicted defendant's potential, or lack of potential, for rehabilita-
tion." United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1978).
148 See State v. Kiser, No. 82-CR69, trial op. at 12-15 (C.P. Ross County 1983) (the defen-
dant successfully argued proportionality at the trial stage); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (approving of appellate procedures which review proportionality of
sentence).
119 H. BEDAU, supra note 139, 241-46.
150 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
11" Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 622 (1978) (White J., concurring). "By encouraging de-
fendants in capital cases, and presumably sentencing judges and juries, to take into consid-
eration anything under the sun as a 'mitigating circumstance' it will not guide sentencing
discretion but will totally unleash it." Id. at 631. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1-2 408 U.S. 238, 256 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); see id. at 314 (White, J., concur-
ring). "I simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the
infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so
wantonly and so freakishly imposed." Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
153 No intimation is made concerning the degree of weight that specific evidence proffered
on behalf of the defendant that executions do not deter murder or types of murder should
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terrence, would still be channeled and directed toward the goal of elimi-
nating "the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors
which may call for a less severe penalty.""1 4 A less severe penalty would
be called for if the death penalty were found not to deter.
The Supreme Court has stated that the death penalty should be im-
posed in such a manner that would afford a "meaningful basis for distin-
guishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in
which it is not. '' 15 5 The admission of all types 5 6 of mitigating evidence
would not destroy that meaningful basis for distinguishing life from death
cases. In some instances the sentencing authority would disregard this ev-
idence, or afford it little weight in view of the aggravating circumstances
present in the case. When, however, there is an equilibrium in the weigh-
ing process, such that a decision to execute a defendant would in fact be
discretionary, arbitrary, or capricious,'15 the proffered evidence on the
non-deterrent effect of execution may tip the scales in favor of life over
death.
IV. WEIGHING
Once the mitigation phase has concluded, the crucial weighing process
begins. The sentencing authority must determine by proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt whether the applicable aggravating circumstances are suffi-
cient to outweigh the mitigating factors present in the case. 5  The sen-
tencer has already found the defendant guilty of the aggravating
specifications or circumstances at the trial stage. The major problem for
the defendant is establishing the presence of the mitigating factor so that
it may be weighed properly against the aggravating circumstances.
have in the crucial calculus, the weighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors.
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188.
l8 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
"5 What other states have considered relevant enough to the issue of death to be stated
expressly as a mitigating factor should be relevant enough for purposes of mitigating factor
seven. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G)(4) (Supp. 1981) (the offender could not rea-
sonably have foreseen that his conduct would cause or create death to another person); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2)(b) (1979) (the offender acted under unusual influences or pres-
sures); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 69(b)(6) (Michie/Law Co-op Supp. 1983) (defendant
was battered or otherwise sexually or mentally abused by the victim in connection with or
immediately prior to the murder); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-6(H) (Supp. 1981) (the of-
fender cooperated with authorities); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.070(8) (Supp. 1982)
(whether the offender will pose a danger to others in the future). See State v. Forney,
No. CR 82 4443 (C.P. Summit County 1983). In Forney, the three-judge panel found as
mitigating factors the fact that the defendant had "no prior calculation and design to kill
the victim" and the fact that the defendant "acted upon instantaneous deliberation moti-
vated by fear." Id. trial op. at 2.
1"7 See Appellant's Brief, supra note 52, at 103; see also Comment, Capital Punishment
and the Burden of Proof: The Sentencing Decision, 17 CAL. W.L. REV. 316, 349 (1981).
... OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(2) (Page 1982).
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This problem is caused by the lack of a standard for burden of proof. " 9
The statute does not state that the prosecution must prove the absence of
any mitigating factors,'6 0 but only that the "defendant shall have the bur-
den of going forward with the evidence."' 6 ' The statute's silence in this
regard may be more damaging to the defendant than if he had to prove,
by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of any mitigating fac-
tors. The lack of a standard for burden of proof means that a mitigating
factor is never really established as required. Consequently, some mitigat-
ing factors may never rise to a level competent to outweigh the aggravat-
ing circumstances present in the case. The Supreme Court has stated
that:
A statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from giv-
ing independent mitigating weight to all aspects of the defen-
dant's character and record and to circumstances of the offense
proffered in mitigation creates the risk that the death penalty will
be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe
penalty. 16 2
The Ohio statute fails to provide independent mitigating weight to prof-
fered evidence, i.e., independent from the issue of guilt determined at the
trial stage. This fundamental failure is evident in many cases where the
court imposed death on the offender.
For example, in State v. Glenn,6 ' the defendant was found guilty of
aggravated murder with the specification of killing a peace officer. The
court's opinion listed the specific mitigating factors presented by the de-
fendant, indicating which were present. The first three factors were dis-
missed for lack of evidence, as were the sixth and seventh factors.16 4 Since
the defendant was only nineteen, the mitigating factor of "youth" should
have been established. The court noted the defendant's age and that he
had "some lack of mental capacity, but the evidence was that the defen-
dant planned and put into execution a scheme to free his brother from
jail and to kill, if necessary an officer.' 65
The lack of independent consideration is equally evident in the court's
treatment of the fifth factor. The court noted that the defendant's crimi-
nal background did not constitute "a substantial history of prior criminal
'5 See Appellant's Brief, supra note 52, at 101-03.
160 Id.
'6 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(1) (Page 1982).
6, Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (emphasis in original).
No. 81 CR 933 (C.P. Portage County 1982).
'' Id. trial op. at 3-4.
I6 Id. at 4. See State v. Byrd, No. B-831662 (C.P. Hamilton County 1983). In Byrd, the
offender's age of 19 should have established the presence of mitigating factor four. The
court, however, stated that there was "no evidence to suggest that his age was a factor that
should be taken into account in mitigation of the sentence of death." Id. trial op. at 10. See
supra text accompanying notes 89-100.
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activity but [was] certainly sufficient to show the vicious tendency of the
defendant."' 6 Thus, the court failed to establish this mitigating factor as
well. The actual weighing process was a foregone conclusion. The court
concluded that the aggravating circumstance outweighed any mitigating
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and sentenced the defendant to
death."6 7
The purpose of a mitigation hearing is explained in State v. Woods:'
The question at [the mitigation] stage is not guilt, for guilt has
already been determined. Nor is it primarily whether the stan-
dards of conduct imposed by the criminal law have been upheld
in order to express society's disapproval of the criminal act and to
deter others, for those goals too are largely accomplished by the
verdict. Rather the purpose of mitigation is to recognize that the
punishment assigned for a criminal act may for ethical and hu-
manitarian reasons, be tempered out of consideration of the indi-
vidual offender and his crime.' 69
The legislature's inclusion of mitigating factors in the capital statute is an
expression of specific humanitarian and ethical concerns by which courts
should be bound.
The flaw in the Glenn court's reasoning is shared by State v. Rogers.'
7 0
The defendant in Rogers was found guilty of a heinous crime, the rape
and aggravated murder of a young girl. The defendant was also found
guilty of two specifications.' 7' In its opinion, affirming the jury's recom-
mendation of death for the defendant, the court discussed the applicabil-
ity of each mitigating factor. The court concluded that mitigating factors
one through six' 72 were inapplicable and would not be the subjects of any
consideration.17 1 Mitigating factor seven was analyzed in view of the de-
fendant's history, character, and background. The court acknowledged
the clear evidence that defendant was a mentally-retarded person who
functioned at a fourth-grade level.' 74 Furthermore, the defendant was a
wanderer with minimal skills for self-support.'7 5 However, the court
stated that it failed to "see any direct or positive correlation between the
Byrd, No. B-831662, trial op. at 10.
167 Id. at 5.
166 48 Ohio St. 2d 127, 357 N.E.2d 1059 (1976).
'e Id. at 137, 357 N.E.2d at 1066 (emphasis added).
170 No. 81-6906 (C.P. Lucas County 1982).
171 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(7) (Page 1982) (offense committed while offender
committed kidnapping and rape).
172 See supra text accompanying notes 53-58 for the court's discussion of mitigating fac-
tor three.
17' Rogers, No. 81-6906, trial op. at 10-20 (C.P. Lucas County 1982).
174 Id. at 16.
175 Id.
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defendant's I.Q. . . . and his ability to kidnap, rape and murder."" 6
The defendant's I.Q. was tested in the 68-72 range. 7 7 Despite such
mental retardation, the court stated that:
To apply a psychological-academic intelligence quotient standard
in determining possible punishments for a crime would result in
the imposition of an infinite multitude of disparate sentences for
the commission of the same offense by different citizens under
the same body of laws. Thus, we would have the unequal applica-
tion of the law .... 17
Apparently, the Rogers court did not heed the command in Lockett that
an "individualized decision is essential in capital cases."'1 79 The precise
purpose of mitigation hearings is to differentiate among individuals for
purposes of punishment. There are sentencing guidelines in Ohio for non-
capital cases as well. 80 The Rogers court could have established the exis-
tence of mitigating factor seven, based upon the defendant's lack of intel-
ligence, and still have found that the aggravating circumstances out-
weighed the mitigating factors. However, the court concluded that it
could find "no ability to give the defendant any consideration under miti-
gating factor number seven."1'
The Supreme Court, in Eddings v. Oklahoma,8' reversed a sixteen-
year-old offender's death sentence because the sentencer refused to con-
sider, as a matter of law, relevant mitigating evidence proffered by the
defendant."8 3 The Rogers court's statement that an "unequal application
of the law" would result if the intelligence of the defendant were consid-
ered in mitigation closely approaches the concept found offensive by the
Eddings court. The law in Ohio does countenance disparity of treatment
between offenders. In capital cases this treatment should be more, not
less pronounced.
In State v. Jenkins,'8 the defendant was found guilty of the aggra-
vated murder of a police officer and all five specifications.'8 5 At the sen-
17I Id. at 24.
... Id. at 22.
178 Id. at 24-25.
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605.
180 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.12(C) (Page 1982) (listing factors to be considered in
favor of imposing a shorter term of imprisonment for a felony).
,81 Rogers, No. 81-6906, trial op. at 25 (C.P. Lucas County 1982).
182 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
181 Id. at 114. The defendant sought to proffer evidence of his emotional disturbance and
unhappy upbringing. Id. at 115.
18, No. CR 168784 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1982).
'85 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(3) (offense committed while escaping apprehen-
sion for another offense); (5) (killed or attempted to kill two or more persons); (6) (victim
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tencing phase, the defendant presented evidence as to the existence of the
third and seventh mitigating factors. As in Rogers, the debate centered on
the defendant's lack of intelligence.' The defendant had an I.Q. of 63,
with a psychological age of 9.3 years.'87 He presented evidence that
mental retardation affected his judgment in becoming involved in the
criminal activity, and also influenced his judgment inside and outside the
bank on the day of the offense.'88 The court pointed to testimony of the
defense psychologist, who admitted on cross-examination that despite his
mental retardation, the defendant could have formed intent, refrained
from shooting the police officer, and could have laid down his gun and
surrendered to the police."8 '
The court also pointed to the testimony portraying the defendant not
as a "follower" but as a "proficient, modern-day criminal."' 90 The court
then concluded "that the impact of Jenkins' I.Q. as a mitigating factor is
quite minimal when weighed against the aggravating circumstances which
the defendant was found guilty of committing.' 19 The court also stated
that a person "should never be held accountable for a crime in a greater
or lesser degree dependent upon the gradations of his color, difference in
sex, or intellectual ability."'19 Thus, the court committed the same error
as did the Rogers court. No mitigating consideration would be given to a
mentally-retarded offender.
In its conclusion, the Jenkins court stated what it apparently would
have considered as appropriate mitigating factors:
If one scrutinizes the so-called mitigating factors, one immedi-
ately notices that all of these have the following basic characteri-
zation: there is absolutely nothing positive, redeeming, compli-
mentary, honorable, pleasant, patriotic, religious, respectful, or
respect compelling about the defendant. To the contrary, the so-
called mitigating factors basically call for emotional considera-
tions of sympathy and mercy.193
Thus, the five aggravating circumstances outweighed the absent mitigat-
ing factors and the court affirmed the jury's recommendation of the death
sentence.
In Glenn, Rogers, and Jenkins, the courts have seemingly inappropri-
ately weighed various mitigating factors. Some of these factors, youth and
lack of criminal history in Glenn for example, were never established. An-
... State v. Jenkins, No. CR 168784, trial op. at 9-19 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1982).
187 Id. at 11.
188 Id. at 9.
1 Id. at 13.
"' Id. at 18.
191 Id.
'9' Id. (emphasis added).
isa Id. at 33.
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other mitigating factor, mental retardation, was dismissed by both the
Rogers and Jenkins courts as undeserving of any consideration. Mental
retardation does not fit the specific language of mitigating factor three,
and therefore will be considered, if at all, under mitigating factor seven. 94
But the courts seem unreceptive to this evidence because retardation
does not provide a legal excuse for the crime. However, the courts fail to
grasp a vital distinction: mitigating factors reduce culpability, rather than
excuse crime.
The statute states that the aggravating circumstances must "outweigh"
the mitigating factors.'9 8 The balance hinges on the preponderance-of-
the-evidence test. If the aggravating circumstances even marginally out-
weigh the mitigating factors, death would seem to be mandated by the
statute.' 96 For that reason it is imperative that the trial courts be more
discerning when dealing with the existence of mitigating factors. Despite
the justifiable outrage and revulsion which surround an aggravated mur-
der trial, the courts must ungrudgingly accept what the Ohio General As-
sembly has legislated-that the existence of mitigating factors calls for a
reduced sentence. This is especially true when an offender may be found
guilty of numerous specifications stemming from a single incident. 9 ' The
existence of a set number of specifications should not be tantamount to
an automatic death penalty.' The trial courts have an affirmative duty
to review jury recommendations of death. The courts need not give any
special deference to a decision by the jury in this regard. Therefore the
courts must display a greater observance of the rights of the offender in a
capital case. The right of the offender to have his unique characteristics
fairly considered and evaluated by the sentencing judge and jury is chief
among these rights.
V. CONCLUSION
The constitutionality of Ohio's capital statute will surely be tested in
the years ahead. Simply by increasing the number of mitigating factors
that the sentencer may consider, the legislature has not cured the statute
of serious defects. While the statute does contain important safeguards
absent from the prior law, troublesome questions remain as to whether
this statute can be applied with fundamental fairness. If the trial courts'
"I See supra text accompanying notes 47-50.
195 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(2) (Page 1982).
196 Appellant's Brief, supra note 52, at 103.
191 See id. at 92-93.
,98 In some situations the sheer number of specifications would seem to preclude a finding
that the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating circumstances. For example, the defen-
dant in State v. Spisak, No. CR-176651 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1983), was found guilty of
four separate counts of aggravated murder involving 19 specifications. Id. trial op. at 8. The
court concluded that "[wihen compared to the aggravating circumstances present in the
several counts, the factors in mitigation seem insignificant indeed." Id. at 9.
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opinions are any indication of the way the appellate courts will interpret
and weigh the various mitigating factors, this statute may not have the
life span of its predecessor.
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